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Funnm lNrmmsTs-hmm Vrvos APPLICATION oF WoRTmER T:rn.E DooTRINE-DEsTRuCTioN OF THE Doctor v. Hughes RuLE-In one case, settlor executed an instrument whereby certain property was conveyed to trustees to pay
the income therefrom to settlor during her life and upon her death to convey
the principal of the trust estate to such persons as she should appoint in her
will, or, in default of appointment, to her next of kin as in intestacy. In addition,
settlor reserved to herself the right and power to approve and join in the execution of any conveyance or mortgage of the property. After the settlor died
without having exercised the power of appointment, her four children applied
as next of kin for an order directing the trustee to distribute the corpus of the
trust estate among them in equal shares as remaindermen and for a determination that the surviving spouse of settlor had no interest in the trust fund. Upon
the granting of the order by the lower· court, the executor appealed on the ground
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that the limitation to the next of kin bad resulted in a reversion. In a second
case involving a similar trust instrument, the settlor alone attempted to work a
revocation pursuant to section 23 of the New York Personal Property Law
which permits a settlor to revoke a trust in personal property with the consent
of all persons "beneficially interested" in the trust.1 The trustee questioned the
validity of the revocation on the ground that. the limitation to tl1e next of kin
created a remainder instead of a reversion and, therefore, the consent of the
presumptive remaindermen was necessary. The settlor appealed from a judgment denying the attempted revocation. Held, in a combined review of both
cases, order and judgment affirmed. Despite the language of Doctor v. Hughes 2
that a limitation to the heirs3 of a grantor creates a reversion unless there is
clear evidence to the contrary, the rule has been limited ,in application, to the
extent that it is now merely a presumption in favor of reversions which may be
tebutted by an indication of a contrary intent gathered from the instrument as
a whole. The reservation by settlor of a testamentary power of appointment
over the subsequent disposition of the corpus of the trust estate was a sufficient
indication of such contrary intent. In re Burchell's Estate, 299 N.Y. 351, 87
N.E.(2d) 293 (1949).4
The significance of this decision lies not so much in what was actually
decided as in the language that was used. 5 For really the first time the New
York Court of Appeals has expressly recognized that a whole series of cases,
of which the principal one is but a part, has resulted in a departure from a
position that the court had heretofore·maintained was consistent. 6 Historically
the worthier title doctrine in the context of inter vivos conveyances amounted
to an absolute rule of law whereby any attempt by a grantor to create a remainder
in his heirs would be.ineffective and would automatically result in a reversion. 7

real

1 A similar statute applies to trusts composed of
property. N.Y. Real Prop. Law,
§ll8 (1932).
2 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 221 (1919).
3 While the rule is usually stated in terms of 'heirs' for sake of convenience, it is
nonetheless applicable when 'next of kin' is used, especially as to personalty. Oler, "'Remainders' to Conveyors' Heirs or Next of Kin," 44 D1cK. L. REv. 247 at 252 (1940);
125 A.L.R. 548 at 560 (1940).
4Also noted in 35 VA. L. llilv. 794 (1949) and 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 319 (1949).
5 There was already strong authority at the court of appeals level in New York for
the proposition that the reservation of a testamentary power of appointment is a sufficient
expression by the grantor of his intent to create a remainder. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust
Co., 250 N.Y. 298, 165 N.E. 454 (1929); Engel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 43,
19 N.E. (2d) 673 (1939); Richardson v. Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E. (2d) 54
(1948).
o Cf. Richardson v. Richardson, 298 N.Y. 135, 81 N.E. (2d) 54 (1948), decided
about one year prior to the principal case on strikingly similar facts, where this same court
stated the problem as'follows: "Thus direction to transfer trust property to one's next of kin
is insufficient in and of itself to create a remainder. There must be additional factors, i.e.,
other indications of intention in order that there may be found "sufficient" or "clear expression" of.intention on the part of settlor to create a remainder to his next of kin."
1 For a clear statement of the history of, and basis for, the doctrine of worthier title
as applied to inter vivas conveyances, see: 1 S11\rns, FUTtmE lNTEREsTs §144-148 (1936);
3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT§ 314 (1940).
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But in 1919 Judge Cardozo in writing the opinion of the landmark case of
· Doctor v. Hughes announced that the ancient rule had survived only to the extent that "to transform into a remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion,
intention to work such a transformation must be clearly expressed."8. This clear
suggestion that the rule was now one of construction instead of law was adopted
by the majority of the courts considering the question. 0 However, the decisions
in New York since Doctor v. Hughes, while espou~ing the rule announced in
that case, have greatly weakened its application by actually holding that the
contrary intent need not be clearly expressed but can be gathered frbm indications in the trust instrument as a whole.10 It is the court's clear and unequivocal
recognition of this rejection of Cardozo's language in Doctor v. Hughes in favor
of the milder position, which makes the principal case important. It can easily
be argued that these decisions have done away completely witl1 any kind of
effective rule whatsoever.11 Rules of construction are said to operate like rebuttable presumptions and, as such, the number of factors necessary to rebut
them varies.12 Whereas Doctor v. Hughes adopted a strong presumption, the
~pproach now followed appears to be but a presumption of window dressing
proportions. As the conllicting case results point out, the sole reservation of a
testamentary power to appoint by will, where the grantor has made a limitation
to his heirs, is itself capable of two interpretations when trying to determine
if a remainder or a reversion has been created.13 How, then, can it be said that
any real presumption exists when an ambiguous factor is allowed to rebut it?14
In any trust deed something can be found that a court can seize on as pointing
one way or the other. While there has been this rejection of any effective presumption in favor of reversions, there is at the same time an unwillingness to
give full effect to language limiting an interest to a grantor's heirs by calling
it a remainder.1u By adopting this halfway approach in an admittedly ambiguous

s Emphasis supplied.
O For a complete analysis of the various states' holdings on this, see Morris, ''The
Inter Vives Branch of the Worthier Title Doctriµe," 2 OKLA, L. REv•.133 at 143 (1949);
125 A.L.R. 548 at 555 (1940).
lO Principal case at p. 297: ''It is clear from the case.~ in this State since Doctor v.
Hughes ••• that, despite the language in that opinion • • • , the rule has been less limited
in application.••• The presumption ••• has lost much of its force since Doctor v. Hughes,
supra. Evidence of intent need not be overwhelming in order to allow the remainder to
stand." See also, 62 HAnv. L. REv. 313 at 314 (1948).
11 " ••• unless some simple, explicit, clear cut rule of construction is adopted ••• it
is probable that this rule ••• will break down from the sheer weight of its own complications and uncertainties." Warren, 2 UNIV. TonoNTo L.J. 389 at 392 (1938).
12 SIMES, FUTURB nrrERESTS §309 (1936).
13 For a compilation of cases, see Morris, "The Inter Vives Branch of the Worthier
Title Doctrine," 2 OKLA. L. REv. 133 at 151 (1949).
14 " ••• the fact that he has omitted to reserve a power to appoint in any way except
by will is some indication that he intended to make his heirs or next of kin beneficiaries
of the trust ••. ; but it is not of itself sufficient to overcome the inference that he intended
to be the sole beneficiary of the trust." 1 TnusT RESTATEMENT.§ 127 (1935).
15 Principal case at 297.
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area, this court has removed any real guide posts.16 Consequently, a stand
should be taken one way or the other, and it is submitted that the rule of Doctor
-v. Hughes is the more rational. Not only does it make for greater freedom of
alienability, but it is most likely to accord with the general subjective intent
of the grantor who probably never wanted to create an indestructible interest.17

Daniel A. Isaacson, S.Ed.

16 Nossa!l}an, "Gifts to Heirs-Remainder or Reversion," 24 CALIF, S.B.J. 329 at 330
(1949).
17 3 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §314, comment a. (1940); 62 HARV, L. REv. 313 at
314 (1948).

